Introduction
In May 2017, the International Criminal Court published the latest edition of its left with a choice between conferring procedural rule-making power to judges, or depending on some external body to establish rules of procedure and evidence.
Traditionally, the international tribunals' preference has been to leave this role to the judges, with some important exceptions and nuances.
There was some debate at Nuremberg over whether a 'liberal rule-making power' 12 should be left to the Tribunals, or whether detailed procedural rules should be outlined in advance. 13 Ultimately, the Charters of both the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(IMTFE) at Tokyo stated that the Tribunals would draft (and, in the case of the IMTFE, amend 14 ) their own rules of procedure, and that those procedural rules would not be inconsistent with the Tribunals' Charters. 15 One might expect from this wording that the judges would constitute the 'Tribunal' for these purposes, but interestingly, it fell to the Chief Prosecutors to prepare a draft of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which was later adopted by the President of each of the Tribunals. 16 The Rules 13 This was the preference of the Soviet delegation: ibid., 71. 14 The power to amend the IMT Rules of Procedure was conferred via the Rules themselves, specifically Rule 11. 15 Art 13 IMT Charter; Art. 7 IMTFE Charter. 16 V. Tochilovsky, 'The Nature and Evolution of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence', in K. Khan et al (eds), Principles of Evidence in International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2010), 157, 159. contained just nine Rules, whilst the IMT Rules of Procedure was comprised of just eleven.
At the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), explicit statutory authority was granted to the judges of the Tribunal to adopt 'rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters'. 17 The Security Council, having completed the Tribunal's Statute, seemed content to confer responsibility on the judges of the Tribunal to enunciate a full procedural framework for the Tribunal's operation. 18 As the Appeals Chamber noted in Tadić, 'the Statute is general in nature and the Security Council surely expected that it would be supplemented, where advisable, by the rules which the Judges were mandated to adopt, especially for Trials and Appeals'.
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While the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone expressly mandated the judges to adopt the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of their predecessors, judges were also given the power to amend those Rules as they saw fit. 20 The Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon grants judges the power to adopt and amend Rules of Procedure and Evidence, taking both Lebanese criminal procedure and other relevant international procedural standards into account. 21 Even in those hybrid tribunals where the expectation is that domestic criminal procedure will apply, such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, judges are permitted to adopt or amend Rules to ensure their compliance with international standards.
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Although some authors believed that it would have been inappropriate for the The change in nomenclature was to reflect the fact that the guidance therein no longer solely related to the pre-trial stage of proceedings. 103 However, the focus of the Manual remains predominantly on pre-trial procedure. A second amended version was released in 2017.
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As outlined in Part 2 above, the Roadmap process for Rule amendments has perhaps not been as successful as was originally hoped in affecting procedural changes in an efficient and collaborative manner. Thus, the judges of the Court have determined that they will attempt to bring about efficiencies in a manner that falls short of full amendment to the RPE, and the Manual is a clear facet of that strategy. 
B. The Content of the Manual
The Chambers Practice Manual is divided into three parts: Part A on pre-trial proceedings, Part B on issues related to trial proceedings before they begin, and Part 121 Thus, it is difficult to conclude that this change in approach is reflective of consistent practice from across the Court, let alone best practice. 
C. The Nature of the Manual as a Source of Law

The Impact of the Chambers Practice Manual in Practice
It is beyond question from the above that the Chambers Practice Manual represents, in principle, nothing more than a guidance document that Chambers should not feel obliged to consistently follow, but that in practice, it has been broadly perceived as an 
A. Evidentiary Thresholds for Confirmation of Charges Decisions
The ICC's statutory framework introduced a procedural hurdle for the prosecution to overcome before a case could proceed to trial, through its confirmation of the charges procedure. Pursuant to Article 61 (7) previous confirmation decisions had been critiqued for their length and detail. 144 On the other hand, the presumption of innocence necessitates that a person should not be put on a trial for a crime where there is a lack of sufficiently compelling charges going beyond mere theory or suspicion. 145 The fact that four cases had failed to reach the evidentiary threshold shows the value of the process for protecting both the right to liberty of suspects and the resources of the Court, by ensuring that prosecutions where there is no realistic prospect of success are not pursued. While other legal systems subject charges to less searching scrutiny before cases can proceed to trial, the Confirmation of Charges hearing is an important part of the ICC's legal framework. 146 The Chambers Practice Manual attempts to relieve some of the uncertainty surrounding the evidentiary threshold by establishing clear guidelines on the scope and quality of evidence required for the confirmation stage of proceedings. The
Manual establishes that live witnesses are not required at this stage of proceedings, 147 that there is no need for parties to prepare an 'in-depth analysis chart' or similar, linking the evidence to the charges, 148 and that Pre-Trial Chambers should not provide footnotes in the 'charges' section of their confirmation of the charges decisions, linking the charges to the evidence presented to the Chamber. 149 This latter point stands in contrast to recent academic analysis, which has argued for factual findings to be more explicitly linked to the evidence received by the Chamber, not less. 150 Indeed, it could be argued that the Manual effectively lowers the evidentiary threshold for confirmation hearings -previous practice had explicitly required that cases be as important that cases did not proceed to trial where the evidence was 'riddled with ambiguities'. 152 Thus, the previous practice does seem, on its face, to have required a level of evaluation of the evidence that appears to be minimised by the Manual.
This issue came to a head in relation to the first two Confirmation of the Charges decisions issued after the publication of the Pre-Trial Practice Manual -in the cases against Ahmad al-Faqi Al-Mahdi 153 and Dominic Ongwen. 154 Both cases illustrate a deep division between judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber on the extent to which evidence should be thoroughly evaluated for the purposes of establishing whether there are substantial grounds to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed. They also highlight a difference of opinion on the extent to which Chambers are bound to follow the guidance set out in the Manual.
In Ongwen, the defence sought leave to appeal the Confirmation of Charges decision on the basis that it was insufficiently reasoned. 155 It is notable that the Manual sets out strict limits on the extent of Pre-Trial Chambers' reasoning, noting that it should be confined 'to what is necessary and sufficient for the Chamber's findings on the charges', 156 on the basis that the Pre-Trial Chamber should not preadjudicate matters that are to be considered at trial. 157 The Manual also sets out a detailed structure for Confirmation decisions -each decision should distinguish between the 'factual findings', the 'legal findings', and the 'operative part' of the decision, reproducing verbatim the charges put forward by the Prosecutor that have been confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. 158 The intention appears to be, because ICC proceedings do not have indictments per se, 159 the 'operative part' of the confirmation decision would become the conclusive statement of the charges faced by the accused as confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. 160 The Manual states that only the operative part of the decision will be binding, and 'after the charges are confirmed (in whole or in part) by the Pre-Trial Chamber there shall be no discussion or litigation at trial as to their formulation, scope or content.'
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The defence argument in Ongwen was that the Confirmation decision was 'riddled with findings whose basis and reasoning is not clear.' 162 Some examples given included the factual finding at paragraph 56 of the decision, stating that 'the evidence overwhelmingly shows' an effective hierarchical structure within the LRA, but without reference to any evidence, 163 and the findings on communications between Ongwen and Joseph Kony, again unreferenced to the evidence presented.
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Indeed, the length of the Confirmation decision and the degree to which the factual findings are linked to particular pieces of evidence represents a notable departure from previous practice. The 'findings' part of the decision spans fewer than 50 pages with a total of 37 footnotes, 165 which is remarkable, in light of the fact that 70 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes were confirmed. 166 The 'charges' part of the decision, which, as required by the Manual, does not cross-reference any evidence, 167 is almost as long as the first part of the Decision, at 33 pages long. By contrast, the confirmation decision issued in the case of Charles Blé Goudé in December 2014, confirming four counts of crimes against humanity, contains a section dedicated to 'analysis of the evidence' (roughly equivalent to the 'findings' section in the new format for confirmation decisions) that spans 72 pages with no fewer than 421 footnotes referencing the evidence. 168 The operative part 169 of the Blé Goudé Confirmation decision spans seven pages.
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Despite there being a readily apparent difference in the level of detail between its decision and previous confirmation decisions, the Pre-Trial Chamber was less than impressed by the defence's argument on the allegedly insufficient reasoning in the Confirmation decision; it found that any party engaged in judicial proceedings could potentially argue that a decision it disagreed with was not reasoned enough. 171 It went on to hold that 'that the decision is, in the view of the Chamber which rendered it, sufficiently reasoned.' 172 This is a rather unusual response to the allegations of insufficient reasoning. The right to a reasoned judgment requires that a court indicates 'with sufficient clarity the grounds on which they based their decision', 173 so as to make it possible for an accused to exercise their right of appeal if there is an error in those grounds. 174 It would surely have been preferable for the Chamber to indicate precisely how the grounds on which its earlier decision was based were clearly stated in the Confirmation decision, rather than entering into the circular argument that the decision was sufficiently reasoned because the Chamber that issued it thought it to be sufficiently reasoned.
The Chamber further concluded that the Defence had misunderstood 'the nature, purpose and structure of the Confirmation Decision' and that its argument 'is predicated on a failure to appreciate the distinction between the Chamber's reasoning in the Confirmation Decision, on the one hand, and the disposition in such decision (i.e. the confirmed charges), on the other hand.' 175 In other words, the majority noted, the fact that the Chamber did not explicitly link the charges confirmed to the evidence or findings of fact (and in so doing, followed the instruction set out in the Manual), did not mean that it had not provided sufficient reasoning on why those charges were confirmed. However, the defence request for appeal cited the factual findings, and not the operative part of the decision, and thus the defence did not appear to be labouring under a misapprehension of the nature and structure of the Confirmation Decision.
Notwithstanding this fact, it is difficult to reconcile the Chamber's interpretation that a clear link does not need to be drawn between the evidence and the charges with the wording of Article 61 (7), which requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to 'determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged' 176 and to confirm the charges and commit the person for trial only for those charges where it has deemed that there is sufficient evidence to meet the evidentiary threshold of 'substantial grounds to believe'. 177 In addition, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence make it clear that Chambers, including Pre-Trial Chambers, have the authority to freely assess the evidence before them. 178 Previous Pre-Trial Chambers, while acknowledging that the confirmation hearing is not a 'mini-trial', have explicitly acknowledged the role of the hearing in ensuring that 'only those persons against whom sufficiently compelling charges going beyond mere theory or suspicion have been brought' are committed for trial, 179 and that to that end, there must be 'concrete and tangible proof demonstrating a clear line of reasoning underpinning specific allegations.' 180 The majority in That is not, of course, to suggest that no evidence exists on any of the charges;
it is merely to point out that if it does exist, the Pre-Trial Chamber gave no indication of where it could be found. As Judge Perrin de Brichambaut pointed out in his separate opinion to the confirmation decision, the Prosecutor had, at the Chamber's request, provided a 'pre-confirmation brief', which set out in detail the evidence that linked the accused to the charges across over 250 pages. presented met the standard of proof set out in Article 61(7). In his opinion, the majority's decision had failed to 'provide a clear and well-reasoned decision, which presents a full account of the relevant facts and law in order to reveal transparency of the judicial process and guarantee a considerable degree of persuasiveness '. 192 The key issue here is the amount of scrutiny that judges are expected to subject the evidential record to in confirmation decisions. It would appear that the majority opinion in both decisions felt that the evidential record as a whole supported the charges put forward by the prosecution, without feeling the need to rigorously link the evidence with the particular element(s) of the relevant charge. This is symptomatic of a broader debate between 'holism' and 'atomism' in international criminal fact-finding, which I have discussed at length elsewhere. 193 Some might argue that a holistic overview of the evidence is all that is required at the confirmation of the charges stage, where the standard of proof is much lower than the trial standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 194 To subject each piece of evidence to a level of scrutiny that requires the Court to elaborate on precisely which element of the charges that evidence might support, the argument might go, would be to raise the standard of proof from 'substantial grounds to believe' to 'beyond reasonable doubt'. However, as Judge Kovacs pointed out in his dissent in
Al Mahdi, an earlier stage of proceedings with a lower standard of proof 'does not justify a light assessment of facts or disregarding the proper presentation of evidence submitted', 195 it simply requires that a serious examination be carried out of the evidence in the light of the applicable (lower) standard of proof. To subject the evidence to a less searching scrutiny would have the effect of rendering the confirmation of the charges stage little more than a rubber-stamping exercise, where all that is required is for the prosecution to show that some crimes happened in the particular situation and that there are reasons to link the accused to some of those crimes, with the precise details to be worked out later. This would effectively render the confirmation hearing meaningless, and may well lead to inefficiencies later on, where the prosecution is still developing its theory of the case as the trial progresses. Before turning to an examination of the consequences of showing undue deference towards the Manual, it is important to note that the approach of the Majority in both Ongwen and Al-Mahdi has not been universal. In Gbagbo, the defence appealed against a decision that gave notice pursuant to Regulation 55 of the to give some guidance as to how Chambers will act on a particular manner, 208 this undoubtedly is the correct interpretation of the Manual.
B. Consequences of Undue Deference to the Manual
It may be argued that the possibility that some judges have treated the Chambers Practice Manual with more authority than should attach to a guidance document is of little practical concern. Indeed, some may argue that it is a positive development insofar as it ensures consistency across differently-constituted Chambers, although that argument may be unsupported, given the lack of consistency illustrated by the Gbagbo case as discussed above. However, the example set out above -on the level the end of a process. This is significant, not least because cases against four suspects before the Court failed to proceed past the confirmation stage, owing to a lack of evidence. 209 Moreover, the failure to set out a precise evidential basis for the confirmation of charges gives rise to a risk that the defendant will not be in a position to raise defences or introduce competing evidence to defend themselves against the charges, in violation of their rights under Article 67(1)(e) of the Statute. Furthermore, it could be argued that a less rigorous treatment of the evidence reflects a breach of the presumption of evidence, insofar as the prosecution's evidence is not subjected to the searching scrutiny that would be expected where the accused is genuinely presumed innocent.
Excessive deference to the Manual also gives rise to issues surrounding legal certainty, given that the parties will not only have to draft their arguments referencing the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Statute, and established jurisprudence; they will also have to refer to an ever-changing catalogue of 'best practice' identified by the Judges. Given that the Manual can be changed by the Judges of the Court, with no legal record of the impetus for such changes and/or the discussions that led to that change, the process for procedural change at the ICC is likely to become much more opaque that what was envisioned by the drafters of the Statute, who saw the benefit in considering proposed amendments in the public forum of the Assembly of States Parties. While it may be argued that the identification of best practices gives rise to greater legal certainty, the fact that the source of such best practice in the case law is often less than clear perhaps detracts from that potential advantage.
Perhaps as an aside, the minimalist approach to the factual and legal assessment of the evidence and charges, as preferred by the Manual and followed by of an 'attack' for the purposes of establishing the war crime of attacking peacekeeping missions, 210 even though no charges were confirmed against the accused, 211 while the might constitute outrages upon personal dignity, 212 even though no charges were confirmed on this count. 213 It may be argued that it was never the intention of the drafters for Confirmation decisions to provide a full elucidation of the elements of the crimes, 214 but in light of the Court's less than overwhelming rate of completed cases, confirmation decisions have, in the past, borne an important illustrative function that they no longer appear to play. To give an example, in Al Mahdi, the Pre-Trial
Chamber did not enter into a discussion as to the meaning of an 'attack' for the purposes of Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute, but rather noted that the Structures had been targeted for their historical and religious character, and that full destruction of the targeted cultural property was not required under the Statute. 215 Had it entered into an assessment of the meaning of the word 'attack', the Pre-Trial Chamber would doubtless have recalled the Abu Garda Confirmation decision's definition of 'attack'
as meaning 'acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence'; 216 this is difficult to square with the interpretation in Al Mahdi that the destruction of property by a rebel group in territory occupied by, and under the control of, that group constitutes a war crime in non-international armed conflicts. 217 By the same token, the decision by states to destroy a building dedicated to religion, education, art, history, science, or medicine that are not military objectives in times of armed conflicts, regardless of motive, could now constitute a war crime. 218 An absence of detailed reasoning on definitional issues can lead to such anomalies, which are not always solved by later Trial judgments. 219 In addition, given that changes to the ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence are debated in public, via the ASP framework, the use of the Manual to avoid the process set out in the ICC's legal framework, as discussed above, may lead to the perception that a shroud of secrecy cloaks the operation of procedural amendments via the Manual. More generally, this may lead to the dilution of the impression that procedural rules act as a check on judges' untrammelled power, given that it is the judges themselves who are establishing and amending those procedural frameworks.
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Conclusion
The International Criminal Court's Chambers Practice Manual, first introduced in 2015 as a guide to judges of 'best practices' to apply before the Court and amended every year since, has been hailed as a positive step towards consistency in practice, by giving clarity to parties as to best practices developed in the case law which are to be followed. It has also been celebrated as a means to ensure that judge-led amendments to procedural practices can be implemented without recourse to formal processes that can be both unwieldy and excessively politicised. This article provided the first rigorous assessment of the effect of the Manual in practice, and it showed that the Manual marks a return to procedural law-making by judges in international criminal law, despite it being the intention of the drafters of the ICC Statute that the power to draft and amend procedural rules should lie with states. Despite recent attempts to foment, and early success with establishing, a collegiate approach between the Court and the Assembly of States Parties in the amendment of procedural rules, the practice surrounding formal Rule amendments quickly became politicised and protracted, and this has led to an explicit acknowledgement by judges that they will seek to enact procedural changes through less formal means.
In light of that change in direction, the Chambers Practice Manual is likely to grow in significance as the Court moves away from formal amendment of its legal framework. However, this article has shown some difficulties in that approach, given that aspects of the Manual appear to extend beyond what might be expected from a mere guidance document. Furthermore, this article illustrates that some judges, in the early practice surrounding the Manual, have perhaps given it more deference than it deserves, given that it is neither a primary nor a secondary source of law before the 
